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IH THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
1..\ i\1.\H PEA Y,

Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
TilE PROVO CITY SCHOOL DIS-

TRICT, A BODY CORPORATE
.\NO POLITIC, AND MERRILL
CHRISTOPHERSON, RAY MURDOCK, SHIRLEY PAXMAN, WILFORD E. SMITH, AND LA MAR
Ei\IPEY, MEMBERS OF SAID
BOARD,
Defendants and Respondents

Case No.
9722

PETITION FOR REHEARING OF
AMICUS CURIAE

PETITION FOR REHEARING OF AMICUS CURIAE
The Board of Education of Salt Lake City, the

Board of Education of Ogden City, the Board of Education of ~lurray City, and the Board of Education
nf Granite School District, all public corporations,
pursuant to orders of the court allowing said Boards
1
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of Education to join as amicus curiae, respectfully
petition the court for rehearing in the a hove entitled 1
cause. Petitioners rely upon the following points\,
as error in the decision of the court:
PoiNT

1

The term "electors" as used 1n Utah Code
Annotated (1953) Section 53-7-24, as amended, re-'
specting leeway elections, does not limit the individuals entitled to vote to those who have paid a
property tax in the year next preceding such election.
A. The term "elector" as used in Section
53-7-24 defines the qualification of voters and'
there is no uncertainty or ambiguity as to its
meaning. The meaning of the word "electors'!.
is not modified by reference to other statutory
provisions which set forth the "manner" of
holding elections or the "procedure" to be
followed in conducting such elections. All
"electors" may therefore vote.
B. To construe the term "electors" as set
forth in the leeway election statute to mean
"tax paying electors" is a strained construction
and would be in violation of our State Consti·
tution.
PoiNT

2

In the event that this court should decide that thE
term "electors," as set forth in Section 53-7-24, mearu
2
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those electors who have paid a property tax in the
year preceding the election, the election nevertheless
may not be invalidated unless the plaintiff has shown
that sufficient improper votes were cast to change
thr n•sult of the election.
PoiNT

3

ThP forn1 of the notice of election and of the

proposition voted upon were sufficient.
Dated this 1st day of March, 1963.

MARR, WILKINS & CANNON
PAUL B. CANNON
STEPHEN A. WEST
Attorneys for Board of Education of
Salt Lake City
SAMUEL C. POWELL
Attorney for Board of Education of
Ogden City
RICHARD C. HOWE
Attorney for Board of Education of
Murray City
McKAY AND BURTON
DAVID L. McKAY
Attorney for Board of Education of
Granite School District

3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
This court based its decision of December 3'1
1962, on two points: First, that the voters at the'
leeway election should have been limited to those
who had paid a property tax in the preceding year,
and, second, that the notice was insufficient. Our
position on these two matters is covered in Points
1 and 3. Point 2 was not referred to in the court's
opinion. Petitioners herein are other school districts
which have held successful leeway elections.
Whether or not this court reaches a different ultimate
result with respect to the Provo School District election, we request that this court reconsider its opinion
with reference to each of the points set forth herein
for the reason that the situation may be, and presumably is, different with respect to each of the
school districts appearing in this petition. The leeway election held by each of such districts may be
valid even though the election in the Provo District
is still declared invalid by reason of only one matter
\
covered by the three points stated.
An early consideration of the petition for rehearing and decision thereon is requested for the reason
that school districts heretofore holding leeway elections may desire to resubmit the leeway question, or
4
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may be confronted with the necessity of budgeting
for the year 1963-64 without the benefit of the right
to maintain a school program in excess of the cost
otherwis~ allowed. By law, the tentative budget for
t>arh school district must be submitted on or before
June l, ( U.C.A. ( 1953), Sec. 53-20-1.) If another lee.,.
way election is to be held prior to the preparation of
the tentative budget, it is almost a necessity that
th~r~ be a decision to do so by a board of education by
April go, 1963. An earlier decision by this court on
this petition for rehearing would be very helpful.
\Ye call attention to these facts for information,
with no intent to impose on the court.
This being a Petition for Rehearing, it is not
felt that the facts and the ruling of the trial court
rrquire r~statement.
Italics throughout this petition and brief are the
petitioners, unless otherwise indicated.
PoiNT

1

THE TERM ··ELECTORS" AS USED IN
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953), SECTION
53-7-2+, AS AMENDED, RESPECTING LEE\Y.-\ Y ELECTIONS DOES NOT LIMIT THE
YOTERS TO THOSE WHO HAVE PAID A
PROPERTY TAX IN THE YEAR NEXT PRECEDING SUCH ELECTION.
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The following is a brief statement of this court's
conclusion in its opinion of December 31, 1962 with
respect to Point No. 1. Section 53-7-24, U.C.A.
( 1953), as amended, provides that a school district
may maintain a school program in excess of the costs
of a program already authorized "with the consent of
a majority of the electors of the district voting at an
election or elections held for that purpose in the manner set forth in section 53-2-12 (53-7-12) Utah Code
Annotated 1953 .... " The court then in accoJ:dance
with the foregoing statute referred to section 53-7-12
which in turn says that the board in holding that
election "shall follow the procedure in elections for
the issuance of bonds so far as applicable." This court
then made reference to elections for the issuance of
bonds, quoting particularly from Section 53-10-11
with respect to "qualification of voters" and held that
such section restricts the persons eligible to vote at a
leeway election to those who have paid a property tax
in the year next preceding such election. Upon this
proposition it held that since the voters had not been
restricted to "tax paying electors" the election was
invalid.
PoiNT

1. A

THE TERM "ELECTOR" AS USED IN SECTION 53-7-24 DEFINES THE QUALIFICATION OF VOTERS AND THERE IS NO UNCERTAINTY OR AMBIGUITY AS TO ITS
6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MEANING. THE MEANING OF THE WORD
"ELECTORS" IS NOT MODIFIED BY REFERENCE TO OTHER STATUTORY PROVISIONS
WHICH SET FORTH THE "MANNER" OF
HOLDING ELECTIONS OR THE "PROCEDURE" TO BE FOLLOWED IN CONDUCTING SUCH ELECTIONS. ALL "ELECTORS"
MAY THEREFORE VOTE.
Section 53-7-24, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, so
far as it refers to electors who can vote provides:
"With the consent of a majority of the
electors of the district voting at an election
or elections held for that purpose in the manner set forth in section 53-2-12 (53-7-12), Utah
Code Annotated 1953, any district may maintain a school program in excess of the cost of
the program referred to in sections 53-7-22
and 53-7-23 above."
In addition to the foregoing language from the
first paragraph, there is the following language from
thf' second paragraph of Section 53-7-24:

"Consideration of such additional program
and of modification, increases or decreases
thereof by such elections may be initiated by
a petition signed by electors of the district
equal to 10% of the number of electors who
voted at a preceding election on said question
or by action of the board of education."
It i~ reasona bl(' to presume that the word
7
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"electors" has the same meaning in both of the above
quoted sentences from Section 53-7-24. The second
sentence is by no possibility tied to any other election
statutes for a definition of electors. The sentence
has to do with a percentage of the number of electors.
They certainly do not have to be "tax paying
electors."
Furthermore, the term "electors" must include
all registered voters unless it is specifically provided
that the electors shall be restricted. Some statutory
and constitutional provisions should be helpful on
this matter. Chapter 2 of Title 20, U.C.A. (1953),
is a complete procedure for determining what is
necessary for registration and thus to qualify a person as an "elector." That chapter does not restrict
the right to vote by any property qualification nor
does it restrict it to those who have paid taxes. Section
20-2-29, the final section of that chapter, states:
"No person shall hereafter be permitted to
vote at any general, special, municipal or
school election, or at any primary election for
the nomination of officers to be voted for at
municipal elections in cities of the first and the
second class, without having first been registered within the time and in the manner and
form required by the provisions of this
chapter.''

8
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.\n elector is one who has met all the qualifications as set forth in said Chapter 2 of Title 20. When
thrsr requirements are met, the right to vote is
Psta blish ed.
This matter is further clarified by the Constitution of the State of Utah. See Article IV entitled
"F.lrctions and Right of Suffrage.''
SPrtion l provides:
'"The rights of citizens of the State of Utah
to vote and hold office shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex. Both male and
female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally
all civil, political and religious rights and
privileges."
Section

~

provides:

''Every citizen of the United States, of the
age of twenty-one years and upwards, who
shall have been a citizen for ninety days, and
shall have resided in the State or Territory
one year, in the county four months, and in
the precinct sixty days next preceding any
election, shall be entitled to vote at such election except as herein otherwise provided."
Sections 3 and 4 deal with immunity from arrest
and inununity from militia duty on election day.
Section 5 provides that "electors" shall be citizens of
the United States and Section 6 disqualifies insane

9
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persons and certain criminals. Section 7 of Articl('
IV then states:
"Exceptin elections levying a special tax or
creating indebtedness, no property qualification shall be required for any person to vote
or hold office.''
Assuming, without admitting, that Section 7 of
Article IV of the Constitution permitted the legislature to restrict the votes in a leeway election to those
who have paid a property tax in the preceding year,
the legislature did not see fit to do so. (That said
Section 7 does not permit the legislature to restrict
votes in a leeway election will be discussed in subheading B. of Point 1.)
The following authorities indicate that where
there is reference to the "manner" of holding an
elction or the "procedure" for holding an election,
there is no reference to the subject of the qualification
of the voter.
The case of People v. Guden, 75 N.Y.S. 347
C1902), dealt with a constitutional provision which
read:
" 'Justices of the peace and district court
justices may be elected . . . in such manner
and with such powers and for such terms
respectively as are or shall be prescribed by
law; . . . . '"
10
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Th~

court said:
"The 'manner of election' does not go to
the question of what body of electors shall
elect."

ln the case of State vs. Zimmerman, 18 7 Wis. 180;
204 N .W. 803 ( 1925), the question was whether the
form of the ballot was intended to be included in the
statutory words "that it shall be submitted in the
1nanner provided by law." The court held that the
word "manner" had nothing to do with the form of
the ballot. Certainly if "manner" does not include
the form of the ballot, it does not include the qualification of voters.
The court said:
". . . the Legislature prescribes that the
question to be voted upon shall be presented
in accordance with the act or resolution directing its submission, etc. Chapter 289 of the
Laws of 1923 does not prescribe the form of
the submission, but provides that it shall be
submitted in the manner provided by law, etc.
The manner of the submission is ·set forth in
detail in said subdivision 8. This raises another question of construction, and involves
the meaning of that portion of section 1 of
article 12, in which the term 'manner' is used.
In Littell v. State, 133 Ind. 580, 33 N.E. 418,
it is said: ' "Manner" signifies "mode of action,
way of performing or affecting anything,
method~ style." '
11
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"In Bankers' Life Ins. Co. v. Robins, 59
Neb. 174, 80 N.W. 486, it is said: 'The manner
of doing a thing has reference to the way
of doing-to the method of procedure. * * *'
"In People v. English, 139 Ill. 622, 29 N.E.
678, 15 L.R.A. 133, the word 'manner' as used
in section 5, art. 8 of the Illinois Constitution,
indicates merely that the Legislature may provide by law the usual, ordinary, or necessary
details required for the holding of the election."
The court later said:
"Where a thing is required to be done in
the manner prescribed by a certain section of
an act, and if such section referred to includes
the element of time and the element of form,
then the term as used must be construed to
mean both time and form. In legal parlance,
in describing a certain procedure, the expression is often used, 'in manner and form,
etc.', thus distinguishing and differentiating
the two terms."
In the case of Livesly v. Litchfield, 47 Ore. 248, 83
Pac. 142 ( 1905), the State Constitution gave the legislature the power to create municipal corporations
by special laws and to prescribe by law the "manner"
of the election or appointment of the officers thereof.
The legislature created the City of Salem, Oregon,
and included in its charter a provision prohibiting
any person from voting at a Salem City election who
12
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had not paid or was not exernpt from the payment
of a road poll tax for the year in which he should
vote. The court held that when the Constitution gave
the legislature the power to prescribe the "manner"
of an election it did not give the legislature power
to prescribe the eligibility of voters.
The court said:
"The authority given by section 7 of article
6 to prescribe 'the time and manner' in which
municipal officers may be elected or appointed
does not, we think, include the power to determine what shall constitute a legal voter."
The court then quoted from the case of Coffin v.
Elec. Commissioners, 97 Mich. 188, 56 N.W. 567,
~1 L.R.A. 662:
"''The authority to direct the time and manner in which judicial officers shall be elected,
and the other officers elected or appointed,
does not involve the power to determine who
shall constitute the electorate. The word 'manner,' it is true, is one of large signification, but
it is clear that it cannot exceed the subject to
which it belongs. It relates to the word
'elected.' The Constitution had already provided for electors, and when it provides that
an officer shall be elected it certainly contemplates an election by the electorate which it
has constituted. No other election is known
to the Constitution, and, when it provides that
the Legislature may direct the manner in
13
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the Constitution providing that 'there may be
a county superintendent of schools in each
county, whose qualifications, powers, duties,
compensation, and time and manner of election, and term of office shall be prescribed by
law' (Canst. art. 8, § 5), the court said that
the word 'manner' as used in the constitutional
provision 'indicates merely that the Legislature may provide by law, the usual, ordinary,
or necessary details required for the holding
of the election,' and not that it may determine the qualifications of voters. The term
'manner of election' has been given the same
interpretation by other courts. Board of Education Commissioners v. Knight, 187 Ind. 108,
117 N.E. 565, 650; Livesley v. Litchfield, 47
Ore. 248, 83 Pac. 142, 114 Am. St. Rep. 920;
People v. Guden, 75, N.Y. Supp. 347; State
v. Adams, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 231."
As can be seen from the foregoing, there is ample
authority from many states that the use of the word
"manner" in providing how an election shall be held
does not refer to the qualification of voters. There is
also the language of Section 53-7-12, which says that
the school board "shall follow the procedure in elections for the issuance of bonds so far as applicable."
"Procedure" even more clearly excludes the question
of qualification of voters. In our search for authorities on the meaning of these words there appears to
be no case holding that "manner" of holding an election includes the qualification of electors.

16
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PoiNT

1. B

TO CONSTRUE THE TERM "ELECTORS"
AS SET FORTH IN THE LEEWAY ELECTION STATUTE TO MEAN "TAX PAYING
ELECTORS" IS A STRAINED CONSTRUCTION AND WOULD BE IN VIOLATION OF
OUR STATE CONSTITUTION.
Appellant in his brief relied particularly upon
Section 53-10-11, Utah Code Annotated (1953), a
part of the chapter dealing with bond elections,
which section very clearly restricts the voting to those
registered voters who have paid a property tax within
the district in the year next preceding such election.
Appellant then quotes from Sections 1, 2, 5 and 16
of Chapter 10, each of which sections specifically
states that only such qualified electors as shall have
paid a property tax shall be eligible to vote. The
legislature, in providing for elections for the creation
of an indebtedness, including the issuance of bonds,
made it abundantly clear that the voters must be
"tax paying electors." The emphasis placed upon the
qualification of voters in an election creating an
indebtedness is a clear indication that if the legislature had intended to limit the voting on a leeway
election to "tax paying electors" it would have said
so. The fact that there are "more than five references
made to the requirement of property tax payments"
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1n the chapter on creating indebtedness, and that
there is no such restriction in the leeway statute, is
rather clear evidence that so much restriction was
intended.
This court took the view in its opinion of December 31, 1962, that the reference to "tax paying
electors" in Chapter 10, Title 53, demonstrated a legislative policy "in the closely analogous situations involving the incurring of indebtedness by school districts." It is true that an affirmative vote in a leeway
election does increase the tax burden, but it does not
incur indebtedness; and it does not follow that the
legislature intended to or must limit the voters in
a leeway election to tax paying electors. There are
many ways in which taxes are increased or decreased
without a vote limited to "tax paying" electors. The
legislature which controls the limit of indebtedness
or the limit of taxes by counties, cities, other municipalities, and school districts, is elected by all of the
registered voters or electors, as are county commissions, city commissions, and school boards. Yet
these bodies control the amount of taxes.
As will appear from the reference to constitutional provisions covering qualification of voters and
the right to vote quoted under subheading A., (page 9
and 10 of this brief), our Constitution has carefully
guarded the right to vote. The legislature in Chapter
18
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10 of Title 53 has carefully followed its prerogative to
limit the electors to "tax paying" electors where an
indebtedness will be incurred. No such clear intent
can be found in the leeway election law, and we
believe it to be a strained construction to apply the
limitations on the right to vote, contained in Chapter
10 of Title 53, to leeway elections. We, therefore,
strongly urge, as a matter of statutory construction,
that there was no intention on the part of the legislature to place any limitation on the right to vote under
Section 53-7-24.
Aside from the question of intent, it would be unconstitutional for the legislature to limit the right
to vote at a leeway election to "tax paying electors."
Article IV, Section 7 of our State Constitution provides:
"Except in elections levying a special tax
or creating indebtedness, no property qualification shall be required for any person to vote
or hold office."
See also Article I, Section 4 of our Constitution; the
last sentence of which provides:
"No property qualification shall be required
of any person to vote, or hold office, except as
provided in this Constitution.''
It is, of course, under the authority of these
sections that the legislature had the authority in
19
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Chapter 10, Title 53 to restrict the voting to those
who had paid a property tax. The entire Chapter
1O, by its heading, has only to do with "creating
indebtedness." Since the leeway election does not
create an indebtedness, the authority to restrict the
voters is not based on the same reason or policy.
Then, it must be asked, is a leeway election an
election "levying a special tax." Clearly it is not.
A special tax is one levied for the purpose of benefiting property or special property. Taxes which are
levied for carrying out the functions of the state are
all general taxes. We refer to the case of Madsen v.
Bonneville lrr. Dist., 65 Utah 571, 239 Pac. 781
( 1925) for the definition of a special tax. The tax
involved in that case was a tax for the support of
an irrigation district. The distinction between a
general and a special tax is clearly set forth in headnote 6 of the case, as follows:
"MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 405-'SPECIAL TAX' DISTINGUISHED FROM 'GENERAL TAX.' A 'general tax' is considered a
contribution for support of state, whereas a
'special tax' or local assessment is considered
as compensation for special benefits to party
paying."
That this is the general rule see 51 Am. Jur., Taxation, Sec. 27, p. 54

20
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"As General or SpeciaL-Taxes, particularly property taxes, are occasionally classified as
general or special. This classification is made
most commonly with respect to the distinction
between the imposition known as a 'special
assessment' and the customary annual tax
imposed upon all property within the taxing
district to provide revenue for the usual and
ordinary day-to-day expenses of the government, the term 'special tax' sometimes being
used as synonymous with the term 'special
assessment.' With respect to general taxes, the
government renders no return of special benefit to any property, but only secures to the
citizen the general benefit which results from
protection to his person and property and the
promotion of various schemes which have for
their object the welfare of all; on the other
hand, special assessments or special taxes
proceed upon the theory that when a local improvement enhances the value of neighboring
property that property should pay for the
improvement."
We submit, therefore, that our legislature has
carefully followed the Constitution by limiting voters
under Chapter 10 of Title 53 to tax paying electors
because that is an election creating an indebtedness.
It carefully did not limit the voters in a leeway
election because it is not an election creating an
indebtedness or levying a "special tax." For this
court to interpret electors to mean property taxpaying electors would be to put an interpretation on the
statute that would put it in conflict with the constitu21
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tion. This court has said, "It is elementary doctrine
universally applied in this country that, if an act is
open to two interpretations or constructions, one of
which creates a conflict with some constitutional
provision, while the other makes the act harmonious
with the constitution, it is the duty of the courts to
adopt the latter interpretation and construction."
Leatham v.Reger, 54 Utah 491, 182 Pac. 187 (1919),
see also The Best Foods v. Christensen, 75 Utah 392,
285 Pac. 1001 (1930), Garfield Smelting Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 53 Utah 133, 178 Pac. 57
(1918)
Furthermore, the leeway election does not itself
levy a tax, but only permits the board of education
to maintain a certain school program in excess of a
cost otherwise provided by statute. The election is
not actually an election levying a tax. If the election
carries, it is only permissive and the board of education then elects whether or not to increase the budget.
In any event, the resulting tax is a general tax, not
a special tax and no property qualification may be
imposed.

22
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PoiNT

2

IN THE EVENT THAT THIS COURT
SHOULD DECIDE THAT THE TERM "ELECTORS," AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 53-7-24,
MEANS THOSE ELECTORS WHO HAVE
PAID A PROPERTY TAX IN THE YEAR PRECEDING THE ELECTION, THE ELECTION
MAY NEVERTHELESS NOT BE INVALIDATED UNLESS THE PLAINTIFF HAS
SHOWN THAT SUFFICIENT IMPROPER
VOTES WERE CAST TO CHANGE THE
RESULT OF THE ELECTION.
Point No. 2 is academic in this case should the
court agree with our position on Point No. 1 that all
registered voters may vote at a leeway election.
While we sincerely believe such to be the law, we
further believe that in the event that the court does
not deem this to be the law, the mere fact that instructions were given that all electors might vote is
insufficient to invalidate an election. We rely both
upon our statute with respect to this matter an_d the
general common law. Section 20-15-1 Utah Code
Annotated ( 1953), provides:
"The election ... to determine any. proposition
submitted to a vote of the people, may be contested: ... (4) When illegal votes have been
received, or legal votes have been rejected, at
the polls sufficient to change the result."
23
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The net result of advertising an election as permitting all electors to vote and instructing the judges
that all electors may vote in the event that this court
decides that electors means tax paying electors is that
some votes, but not all votes, would be invalid. This
question was not discussed in the opinion of the court
on the Provo election. However, this proposition
may be very simply applied. By way of illustration,
the Board of Education of Salt Lake City held
p. leeway election in 1962 which was combined
with a bond election. All electors were permitted to
vote at the leeway election, but only those who had
paid a property tax were permitted to vote on the
bond election. The names of all persons voting on
each question are a matter of record and have been
preserved. There was a total of 10,600 votes on the
bond election and a total of 10,815 votes on the
leeway election. There were, therefore, only 215
more votes cast on the leeway election than on the
bond election. The leeway election carried 8,413 in
favor and 2,402 against. The bond election carried
8,421 in favor and 2,179 against. Prima facie, and
assuming that only tax payers should have voted,
there were only 215 illegal votes cast while the
proposition carried by a majority of 6,011.
The foregoing figures assume that all those voting
on the bond election also voted on the leeway election. With such a similarly overwhelming vote, it
24
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would SC'C'ffi that this is a safe assumption to make.
However, should one not care to indulge in the presurnption, the records are available to show the
names of all of the persons who were issued ballots
and who voted in each election. It could, therefore,
be demonstrated whether or not there were more
than 215 supposedly ineligible votes cast in the
leeway election.
The following cases support the general rule that
an election should not be declared invalid unless it
appears that there were enough illegal votes cast to
change the result of the election.
The case of Buckhouse v. Joint School Dist. No. 28,
85 Mont. 141, 277 Pac. 961 ( 1929) dealt with a situation in which an election involving a school levy
was attacked on the basis that those who voted in
favor of the levy did not appear on the assessment
roles and did not pay taxes on real estate for that
year. The court in reply to this contention said:
"In the view we take of the case it is unnecessary to determine whether the 1927 or 1928
assessment role was the proper guide in determining the qualifications of the voters."
The court took the position that this was so because:
"As before stated, there is no evidence in this
case showing how the illegal votes were cast
and no evidence showing that it was impossible
to make this proof. The rule applicable here
25
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was applied by this court in the case of Atkinson v. Roosevelt County, supra, where it is
said: 'The burden not only rested upon the
plaintiff to prove illegal votes cast, but to show
how they were cast, for if the latter showing is
not made by the evidence, how is the court to
know what deductions to make from the votes
cast? ... It was incumbent on the plaintiff to
show by a preponderance of the evidence the
number of illegal votes received by Wolf Point
in each precinct in which illegal voting was
charged, and that number must be sufficient,
if rejected, to change the result. Where the
ballots cast by illegal voters are capable of
identification or where satisfactory proof is
given as to how the votes were cast, proper
deductions should be made by the court so as
to determine the correct result. But where
votes are shown to have been cast illegally in a
given precinct, neither the entire election nor
that of a precinct should be annulled, if it may
he by the court avoided under the facts. Each
case, however, must be determined upon its
own peculiar facts. The election must be
sustained unless votes cast for a candidate are
found to be illegal in number sufficient to
change the final result.'"
In the Buckhouse case the judgment in favor of the
defendant school district and the county officials was
upheld.
The following statement is taken from the case
of Reitveld v. Northern Wyoming Community Col.
Dist., Wyoming, 344 P. 2d 986 (1959):

26
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''. . . an election is not to be set aside for
mere informalities or irregularities unless they
are shown to have affected the result of the
election."
They also had said:
"Every reasonable presumption will be indulged in favor of the validity of an election
which has been held, and the one asserting
that the election is irregular must bear the
burden of showing that it is otherwise."
Furthermore, a completed election cannot be invalidated without showing that sufficient improper
votes were cast to change the result and that the
improper votes cast, if rejected, would, in fact, have
changed the result.
The general statement of position is contained in
29 C.J.S., Elections, Section 274, Page 394,
"Where an election is contested on the ground
of illegal voting, the contestant has the burden
of showing that sufficient illegal votes were
cast to change the result, and of showing for
whom or for what they were cast."
In 1928 the Oklahoma courts in the case of
In re Incorporation of Town of Big Cabin, 132 Okla.
200~ 270 Pac. 75 ( 1928) stated:
""And where the [in]validity (sic) of elections
is alleged on account of illegal voting, those
27
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seeking to set aside the result, as declared by
the election officials, have the burden of proof,
not only that illegal votes were cast in sufficient
number to change the result, but must show
by whom and for whom or for what issue such
votes were cast."
In 1949 the Maryland court in the case of Wilkinson v. McGill, 192 Maryland 387, 64 A. 2d 266
(1949) stated:
"The question is by no means free from difficulty, but we think the weight of authority
and the better reasoning uphold the view that
complainants, desiring to avoid an election
because illegal votes are cast, have upon them
the burden of proving for whom these votes
are cast. They cannot thrust that burden upon
the Court by arguing that there is a probability
that such votes were cast for the side havin.
the majority. They must prove, or at lee.
attempt to prove, how the illegal voters vote•
If direct proof cannot be obtained from thf
illegal voters themselves, other evidence of a
circumstantial nature may be offered. In any
event, there must be an effort to produce this
proof. If an effort is made, which proves futile,
and there is no way of producing proper evi ·
dence, it may be that the safest procedure is
to throw out the election, but we have not
that situation before us. As we have already
said, the appellees in this case made no effort,
either to prove how the illegal voters cast their
ballots, nor to offer any explanation of their
failure to do so. They did not state that such
evidence was impossible for them to obtain.
28
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Under these circumstances, we must conclude
that they have failed to meet the burden
imposed upon them, and that the election
must stand."
In 1961, the Nebraska court in Arends v. Whitten,
172 Neb. 297, 109 N.W. 2d 363 ( 1961) stated:

1:

· "The answer of school district No. 39 was
exactly the same as that of school district No.
88, except that it contained an additional allegation that certain persons voted at the said
purported election who did not meet the qualifications required of an elector to vote at a
school election. While evidence was introduced on this point, there is no specific assignment of error. In any event, we quote the
following from Mehrens v. Election Canvassing
Board, 134 Neb. 151, 278 N.W. 252: 'In an
election contest on the ground that, through
"ignorance and mistake" of election officers,
enough illegal votes were cast in a voting precinct to change the result of the election, the
burden is on contestant to prove the casting
of the illegal votes and also the candidates for
whom they were cast.' This is a sufficient
answer, because no attempt was made to show
how the alleged unqualified voters actually
voted.''

See also the cases of Wadsworth v. Neher, 138
Okl. +, 280 Pac. 263 ( 1929); Rosenbrock v. School
District iVo. 3, 344 Mich. 335, 74 N.W. 2d 32 (1955);
Thompson v. Cihak, 254 Mich. 641, 236 N.W. 893
( 1931); l\1iller v. Miller, 266 Mich. 127, 253 N.W.
241 ( 1934).
29
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PorNT 3

THE FORM OF NOTICE OF ELECTION AND
PROPOSITION VOTED UPON WERE SUFFICIENT.
The notice of the election in the Provo School
District was as follows:
"Shall the Board of Education of Provo
City, State of Utah, be authorized to maintain
a 'voted leeway' program as provided in Section 11, Chapter 104, Laws of Utah, 1961, not
to exceed ten percent ( 10%) of the minimum
basic program provided by law."
The argument of the appellant on this point
stressed particularly the form of the notice provided
for in Section 53-10-3 Utah Code Annotated ( 1953),
quoting subdivisions 1 through 4. Appellant emphasizes subparagraph (4) of Section 53-10-3 as a statutory provision not complied with in the notice. (See
page 15 of appellant's brief.) The brief there emphasizes by italics that the Notice should contain:
"(4) The amount of indebtedness which the
board proposes to incur or create and for what
purpose.''
Of course, there. is no indebtedness created by
a leeway election and there was, therefore, no
necessity for complying with said subdivision ( 4)
30
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of paragraph 53-10-3. Appellant goes on to say on
page 16 that "the notice skillfully avoids any mention
of a tax levy necessary to support the program."
There is no necessity for mentioning a tax levy
when voting on the proposition set forth in the leeway election statute.
This court without following the argument of
appellant with respect to the invalidity of the notice
stated that it was invalid because there was a
reference to the "minimum basic program" instead
of the "basic" school program as defined by Section
53-7-16 (b). The notice did, however, expressly refer
to "a 'voted leeway' program as provided in Section
11, Chapter 104, the Laws of Utah, 1961."
It seems to us that a reference to the statute providing for the leeway program and actually giving
the specific section is a sufficient notice.

In the case of Kent v. School Dist. No. 28, 106
Okla. 30, 233 Pac. 431 ( 1925) the opinion said:
"It is next contended that there was no statutory notice of the calling of the election as
required by law. It is not claimed that notice
was not given, but that the notice did not
strictly conform to the requirements of the
statute in defining the qualifications of the
electors entitled to vote at such election. The
31
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notice which was posted was introduced in
evidence by plaintiffs and shows it to be the
official form furnished for that purpose by the
state superintendent. No effort was made and
no tender of proof was offered to show that
any person qualified to vote at the election
failed to do so by by (sic) reason of being misled or misinformed as to his rights to vote by
the language of the notice. In McCarty et al.
v. Cain et al., 27 Okl. 82, 110 P. 653, this court
announced the rule that:
'Where a special election is assailed on
the ground of lack of compliance with all
of the statutory requirements in reference
to notice, but there is no averment or
showing that the electors did not have
actual notice or knowledge of the election
and failed to participate therein by reason
thereof, the same will not be held void
on this account.'
''This rule has been approved and followed
in Ratliff et al v. State ex rei, 70 Okl. 152, 191
P. 1038; Lowe v. Consolidated District No. 97,
79 Okl. 115, 191 P.737; State ex rei v. Sullivan
et al., 80 Okl. 81, 194 P. 446; Smith et al. v.
State ex rei., 84 Okl. 283, 203 P. 1046. No
distinction in principle exists between the
instant case and those above cited. In the
instant case the reason for the rule, in view of
the objections to the notice, is somewhat
strengthened by the legal presumption that
all voters know the law, including that fixing
the qualifications of voters in school district
elections."

32

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l t is hard to imagine that the electorate was

influenced by the form of the notice. Usually the
effect of an affirmative vote on an election is well
publicized and voters are more influenced by the
publicity and explanation of those who are for or
against the program than by the form of the notice
or ballot. We, of course, do not mean that the ballot
may take any form. For those who wished to determine of their own knowledge what they were voting
for, there was a reference to the precise section of
the statute wherein the leeway election is provided
for, and that section answers any question in the
mind of an informed voter. It informs him of the
precise question voted upon.
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully request this court to grant a
rehearing in this case. Whether or not the ultimate
decision of this court is to reverse or sustain the trial
court, we request a clarification of the opinion of
December 31, 1962, on all of the points herein stated.
Respectfully submitted,
MARR, WILKINS & CANNON
PAUL B. CANNON
STEPHEN A. WEST
Attorneys for Board of Education of
Salt Lake City
SAMUEL C. POWELL
Attorney for Board of Education of
Ogden City
RICHARD C. HOWE
Attorney for Board of Education of
Murray City
McKAY AND BURTON
DAVID L. McKAY
Attorney for Board of Education of
Granite School District
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